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Abstract
We study a game between two firms in which each
provide a service based on machine learning. The
firms are presented with the opportunity to pur-
chase a new corpus of data, which will allow them
to potentially improve the quality of their products.
The firms can decide whether or not they want to
buy the data, as well as which learning model to
build with that data. We demonstrate a reduction
from this potentially complicated action space to a
one-shot, two-action game in which each firm only
decides whether or not to buy the data. The game
admits several regimes which depend on the rela-
tive strength of the two firms at the outset and the
price at which the data is being offered. We analyze
the game’s Nash equilibria in all parameter regimes
and demonstrate that, in expectation, the outcome
of the game is that the initially stronger firm’s mar-
ket position weakens whereas the initially weaker
firm’s market position becomes stronger. Finally,
we consider the perspective of the users of the ser-
vice and demonstrate that the expected outcome at
equilibrium is not the one which maximizes the
welfare of the consumers.
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen explosive growth in the domain of
digital data-driven services. Search engines, restaurant rec-
ommendations, and social media are among the many prod-
ucts we use day-to-day which sit atop modern data analysis
and machine learning (ML). In such markets, firms live and
die by the quality of their models; thus success in the ‘race for
data’, whether acquired directly from customers or indirectly
via acquisition of rival firms or purchasing data corpuses, is
crucial. In this work, we study two questions: whether such
markets tend towards monopoly, and how competition affects
consumer welfare. Importantly, we consider these questions
in light of the modeling choices that firms must make.
In our model, two firms compete for market share (util-
ity) by providing identical services that each rely on an ML
model. The firms’ error rates depend on their choices of al-
gorithms, models and the volume of available training data.
Each firm’s market share is proportional to the error of its
model relative to the model built by its competitor. This is
motivated by the observation that the services built using ML
are highly accurate, so users are more conscientious of the
mistakes the service makes, rather than the successes. A com-
petition exponent measures relative ferocity of competition
and maps to a plausible Markov model of consumer choice.
See Section 2.2 for more details.
The firms initially possess (possibly differing) quantities of
data, and are given the opportunity to buy additional data at
a fixed price to improve their models. Since data is costly
and relative (rather than absolute) model quality determines
market share, each firm’s best course of action may depend
on the actions of its rival. Hence, each firm acts strategically
and faces two decisions: whether to buy the additional data,
and what type of model to build in order to produce the best
product given the data it ends up with.
The decision of what model to build seems to complicate
the firms’ action space greatly; there is a very large set of
model classes to select from, and different classes have dif-
ferent efficiencies. For example, when restricting attention to
neural networks, the choices of depth and number of nodes
per layer produce different hypothesis classes with different
optimal models. Thus, in principle, the decisions of what
model class to select and whether to purchase additional data
must be made jointly. However, learning theory allows us
to greatly reduce this large action space. In Section 2.1, we
show that the game in which firms jointly choose a model
and whether to attempt to buy the additional data reduces to
a strategically equivalent game in which firms first choose
whether to buy the data and then choose optimal models.
In Section 3, we characterize the Nash equilibria of our
game for different parameter regimes. For no combination
of parameters does exactly one firm wish to buy the data;
unsurprisingly, for very high prices, neither firm buys data,
and for very low prices, both firms do. In the middling
regime, the competitive aspect of the game imposes a ‘pris-
oners' dilemma’-like flavor: both firms would prefer neither
firm buy the data, but each do so in order to prevent the other
from strengthening its position. Moreover, the unique mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium in this regime involves firms in-
creasing their probability of buying data as price increases.
This counterintuitive result follows from the logic of equilib-
rium: firms playing mixed strategies must be indifferent to
buying and not buying the data, and as the price rises, the
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probability that a competitor acquires the data must rise in
order to make investing in data acquisition a palatable option.
Finally, we study whether any of the dynamics of the game
push the market towards a monopoly. Perhaps counter to a
‘rich-get-richer’ feedback loop that might be expected in data
races, we observe that in all equilibria, the data gap (and thus,
market share gap) always narrows (in expectation). As mea-
sured by consumer welfare, this is actually undesirable. Both
the direction of the data gap as well as the welfare impli-
cation may be counterintuitive, particularly with respect to
the well-known stylized fact that market concentration is bad
for consumers. However, consumer data that improves a ser-
vice can be viewed as exhibiting a form of network effects, in
which case perfect competition can result in inefficiency and
under-provisioning of a good [14]. In other words, a greater
data gap would result in more consumers using a less error-
prone service. As for the data race, anecdotal evidence, such
as GM’s acquisition of automated driving startup Cruise, de-
spite Waymo’s earlier market entry and research head-start,
are suggestive (though not conclusive) that these predictions
may be indicative of real-world dynamics [18].
We view our work as a first step towards modeling and
analyzing competition for data in markets driven by ML. Un-
der our simplifying assumptions, we derive concrete results
with relevance both for policymakers analyzing algorithmic
actors as well as engineering or business decision-makers
considering the tasks of data acquisition and model selection.
Our results are qualitatively robust to other natural modeling
choices, such as allowing both firms to purchase the data, as
well as treating the data seller as a market participant; how-
ever, more significant departures may lead to different con-
clusions. See Sections 4 and 5 for more details.
1.1 Related Work
The theory of ML from a single learner’s perspective is well
developed, but until recently, little work had studied compe-
tition between learning algorithms. Notable exceptions in-
clude [2, 16]. We differ from both works by exploring the
comparative statics and welfare consequences of a single de-
cision (data acquisition). Concurrent work [3] studies a game
in which learners strategically choose their model to compete
for users, but users only care about the accuracy of predic-
tions on their particular data. In contrast, users in our model
choose based on the overall model error.
Our work also intersects with several strains of economic
literature, including industrial organization and network ef-
fects [7, 9, 14]. We differ from such models in two key ways.
First, in contrast to assuming a static equilibrium [14] or fix-
ing a dynamic but unchanging process at the outset [10], our
work can be viewed as an analysis of a shock to a given po-
tentially asymmetric equilibrium in the form of the availabil-
ity of new data. Second, the consumers in our model do not
behave strategically (see e.g. [5, 16] for more discussion).
Finally, our work is related to spectrum auctions, competi-
tion with congestion externalities [5], and the sale of informa-
tion or patents [12, 13]. Our results primarily share qualita-
tive similarities: the choice of one firm to buy data (spectrum)
forces the other to do so to avoid losing market share, though
it would not have been profitable absent the rival, and actual
outcomes run counter to consumer preferences (see e.g. [5]).
2 Framework
We formally motivate and model the ML problem of the firms
and demonstrate how this reduces to a game in which the
firms can either buy or not buy the new data.
2.1 Choosing a Model Class
Consider a firm using ML to build a service e.g. a recom-
mendation system. The amount of data available to the firm
is a crucial determinant to the effectiveness of the predictive
service of the firm. Fixing the amount of data, the firm faces
a fundamental tradeoff; it can use a more complex model that
can fit the data better, but learning using a complicated model
requires more training data to avoid over- or underfitting.
We can formally represent this tradeoff as follows. Let H
denote the hypothesis class from which the firm is selecting
its model and assume the data is generated from a distribu-
tion D. Then given m i.i.d. draws from D the error of the
firm when learning a hypothesis from H can be written as
errD(H) = err(m,H) + minh∈H errD(h) [19].
The first term, known as estimation error, determines how
well in expectation a model learned withm draws fromD can
predict compared to the best model in class H. The second
term, known as approximation error, determines how well the
best model in classH can fit the data generated from D.
The approximation error is independent of the amount of
training data, while the estimation error decreases as the vol-
ume of training data increases. The choice of H affects both
errors. In particular, fixing the amount of training data, in-
creasing the complexity of H will increase the estimation er-
ror. On the other hand, the additional complexity will de-
crease the approximation error as more complicated data gen-
erating processes can be fit with more complicated models.
Once the amount of data is fixed, the firm can optimize over
its choice of model complexity to achieve the best error. We
examine a few widely used ML models and their error forms.
As a first example, consider the case where the firm is
building a neural network and has to decide how many nodes
d to use. d is the measure of the complexity of the model class
and givenm data points, the error of the model can be written
using the following simplification of a result from Barron [1].
Lemma 1 (Barron [1]). LetH be the class of neural networks
with d nodes. Then for any distribution D, with high proba-
bility, the error when using m data points to learn a model
fromH is at most c1d/m+ c2/d, for constants c1 and c2.
Fixing m, the choice of d that minimizes the error can be
computed by minimizing the bound in Lemma 1 with respect
to d. This corresponds to d = c2
√
m/c1 and we get that the
error of the model built by the firm is
√
c1c2/m.
As another example, consider the very simple setting of
realizable PAC learning where the data points are generated
by some hypothesis in a fixed hypothesis class.
Lemma 2 (Kearns and Vazirani [15]). Any algorithm for PAC
learning a concept class of VC dimension d must use Ω(d/)
examples in the worst case.
Thus in this setting, in the worst case, firms need Θ(1/)
training data points to achieve error . A similar bound gives
that with high probability, the firms can guarantee error of
Θ(1/m) (see [15]).
In the examples above the error of a firm withm data points
takes the form of either Θ(m−1/2) or Θ(m−1) after the firm
optimizes over the choice of model complexity. Importantly,
the error in both cases (and more generally) degrades as the
number of data points increases. The rate at which the error
degrades is commonly known as the learning rate.
There are other learning tasks with learning rates differ-
ent than the examples above. Consider a stylized model of a
search engine where the set of queries is drawn from a fixed
and discrete distribution over a very large or even infinite set,
and the search engine can only correctly answer queries that
it has seen before. If, as is often assumed, the query distri-
bution is heavy-tailed, then the search engine will require a
large training set to return accurate answers.
In this framework, the probability that a search engine in-
correctly answers a query drawn from the distribution is ex-
actly the expectation of the unobserved mass of the distribu-
tion given the queries observed so far. This quantity is known
as the missing mass of a distribution (see e.g. [4, 8, 11, 17]).
Lemma 3 shows how to bound the expected missing mass for
the class of polynomially decaying query distributions.
Lemma 3 (Decrouez et al. [8]). Let P k for k > 1 be a
discrete distribution with polynomial decay defined over i ∈
N≥0 such that Prx∼Pk [x = i] = i−k/Σ∞j=0j−k. Then the ex-
pected missing mass given m draws from P k is Θ(m1/k−1).
By varying k in the query distribution of Lemma 3, the
learning rate in the search problem can take the form of
Θ(m−i) for any i ∈ (0, 1). Thus, the learning rate for search
may be much faster or slower compared to the previous ex-
amples, and the exact rate depends on the value of k.
We saw that given a fixed amount of data, a firm using ML
can optimize over its learning decisions to get the best possi-
ble error guarantee. Furthermore, while error decays as more
data becomes available, the rate of decay can vary widely de-
pending on the task. We next see how various learning rates
can be incorporated into the parameters of our game.
2.2 Error-Based Market Share
Consider two competing firms (denoted by Firm 1 and 2) that
provide identical services e.g. search engines. We assume the
market shares of the firms depend on their ability to make ac-
curate predictions e.g. responding to search queries. As dis-
cussed above, the quality of their models is determined ulti-
mately by the size of their training data with a task-dependent
learning rate. Each firm trains a model on its data and uses
its model to provide the service. Let err1 and err2 denote the
excess error of the firms for the corresponding models. Intu-
itively, these errors measure the quality of the firms’ services,
so a firm with smaller error should have higher market share.
We assume each firm captures a market share proportional
to the relative errors of the two models. Formally, we define
Firm 1 and 2’s error-based market share as
µ1 = 1− err
a
1
erra1 + err
a
2
=
erra2
erra1 + err
a
2
and µ2 = 1− µ1. (1)
The constant a ∈ N, which we call the competition expo-
nent (inspired by Tullock contest [20]), indicates the ferocity
of the competition, or how strongly a relative difference in
the errors of the firms’ models translates to a market advan-
tage. As a gets closer to 0, the tendency is towards each firm
capturing half of the market, and thus a large difference in
the models’ errors is needed for one firm to gain a signifi-
cant advantage in the market share. Conversely, as a grows
larger, even tiny differences in the models’ errors translate to
massive differences in the market share. (See Figure 1.)
Figure 1: Plot of f = (1− r)a/(ra + (1− r)a) for various a
values. When r = err1/(err1 + err2), f is the market share
of Firm 1.
An error-based model reflects markets for services which
demand extremely low errors, such as vision systems for self-
driving cars. Under the error-based model, if Firm 1 has
99.99% accuracy and Firm 2 has 99% accuracy, Firm 1 will
capture 99% of the market share. By contrast, an accuracy-
based model (i.e. when the market share of Firm 1 is de-
fined as acca1/(acc
a
1 + acc
a
2)) would suggest much less real-
istic near-even split.
Firm 1 Firm 2
err2
err1
acc1 acc2 Figure 2: Vertices denote the
firms and the directed arrows
denote the probability of transi-
tion. acc is shorthand for accu-
racy and err is shorthand for er-
ror.
We provide another justification suggesting that an error-
based market can arise even when the learned model is used
to provide an everyday service in which high accuracy is not
a strict requirement. Consider a customer who, each day, uses
the service. She begins by choosing the service of one of the
firms uniformly at random. As long as the answers she re-
ceives are correct, she has no reason to switch to the other
firm’s service, and uses the same firm’s service tomorrow.
However, once the firm makes an error, the customer switches
to the other firm’s service. The transition probabilities are
therefore given by the accuracy and error of each firm. See
Figure 2 for the Markov process representing this example.
We can think of the market share captured by each firm as
the proportion of the days on which each firm saw the cus-
tomer. This is exactly the stationary distribution of the asso-
ciated Markov process as stated in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. Let µ1 and µ2 denote the probability mass that
the stationary distribution of the Markov process in Figure 2
assigns to Firms 1 and 2. Then µ1 = err2/(err2 + err1), and
µ2 = err1/(err1 + err2).
Sketch of the Proof. By the definition of a stationary distribu-
tion, µ1 and µ2 should satisfy the following conditions:
(1− err1)µ1 + err2µ2 = µ1
err1µ1 + (1− err2)µ2 = µ2.
Given that µ1+µ2 = 1 by definition, we can solve the system
of linear equations to compute the market shares.
Lemma 4 states that the market share of each firm in the
Markov process is exactly the error-based market share as de-
fined in Equation 1 when setting a = 1. A similar argument
motivates an error-based market share for values of a ∈ N,
where the customer switches firms after experiencing a mis-
takes in a row. The probability of making a mistakes in a row
is just errai for Firm i, so the stationary distribution of the
Markov process is exactly the two error-based market shares
as defined in Equation 1.
Using our observations from Section 2.1, we can write the
error-based market share in the large-data regime as follows.
Theorem 1. Letm1 andm2 denote the number of data points
of Firm 1 and 2, respectively. Then for some b ∈ R+, the
market share of Firm 1 can be written (asymptotically) as
µ1 = m
b
1/(m
b
1 +m
b
2).
Sketch of the Proof. Depending on the task at hand, we can
write the err of a firm as Θ(m−r) for some r ∈ (0, 1], where
err refers to the excess error of the model with the smallest
worst-case error. Substituting this into Equation 1 and ignor-
ing lower order terms, which vanish asymptotically, we get
µ1 =
m−ra2
m−ra1 +m
−ra
2
=
mra1
mra1 +m
ra
2
.
Now let b = ra. Since a is a natural number and r is a real
number in (0, 1], the combined competition exponent is a real
number strictly larger than 0.
Because a can be any integer and there exists a correspond-
ing learning problem for any learning rate in (0, 1], Theo-
rem 1 implies that the combined competition exponent in our
game can be any positive real number, motivated by the initial
choice of a and the learning rate of the firms’ ML algorithms.
The reductions and derivations in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 al-
low us to simplify the acquisition games as follows. We first
simplify the actions of each firm to only decide whether to
buy the data or not, since model choice can be optimized
once the number of available data points is known. Moreover,
Theorem 1 not only allows us to simplify the form of market
share, but also provides us with a meaningful interpretation
for any positive (combined) competition exponent.
2.3 The Structure of the Game
Given the reductions so far, we model our game as a two-
player, one-shot, simultaneous move game. Firms 1 and 2 be-
gin the game endowed with an existing number of data points,
denoted by m1 and m2, respectively. Without loss of gener-
ality, we assume m1 ≥ m2. Each firm must decide whether
or not to purchase an additional corpus of n data points1 at a
fixed price of p. The firm can either Buy (denoted by B) or
Not Buy (denoted byNB) the new data. If both firms attempt
to buy the data, the tie is broken uniformly at random (Sec-
tion 4 discusses relaxing the assumption that only one firm
may buy the data). After the purchase, each firm uses its data
to train an ML model for its service.
We assume the particular form of the market share of Firm
1 using the reduction in Theorem 1. The market share of Firm
2 is defined to be one minus the market share of Firm 1.
A strategy profile s is a pair of strategies, one for each of
the firms. Fixing s, the utility of Firm i (denoted by ui(s))
is its market share less any expenditure. The utility of Firm
1 in all of the strategy profiles of the game is summarized in
Table 1 (rows and columns correspond to the actions of Firm
1 and 2). The utility of Firm 2 is defined symmetrically.
Firm 1/Firm 2 Buy (B) Not Buy (NB)
Buy (B) 1
2
(µ1(m1 + n,m2, b)
+ µ1(m1,m2 + n, b)
−p)
µ1(m1+n,m2, b)−
p
Not Buy (NB) µ1(m1,m2 + n, b) µ1(m1,m2, b)
Table 1: u1(s) in all of the strategy profiles of the game.
A strategy profile is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (pure
equilibrium) if no firm can improve its utility by taking a dif-
ferent action, fixing the other firm’s action. A mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium (mixed equilibrium) is a pair of distribu-
tions over the actions (one for each firm) where neither firm
can improve its expected utility by using a different distribu-
tion over the actions, fixing the other firm’s distribution. We
are interested in analyzing the Nash equilibria (equilibria).
3 Equilibria of the Game
We now turn to finding and analyzing the equilibria. First, we
introduce some additional notation. Let
A =
(m1 + n)
b
(m1 + n)b +m2b
− m1
b
m1b + (m2 + n)b
,
C =
(m1 + n)
b
(m1 + n)b +m2b
− m1
b
m1b +m2b
,
D =
(m2 + n)
b
m1b + (m2 + n)b
− m2
b
m1b +m2b
.
These parameters have intuitive interpretations. A/2 is the
expected change in Firm 1’s (or Firm 2’s) market share when
moving the outcome from (NB,B) (or similarly (B,NB))
to (B,B). C is the change in market share that Firm 1 re-
ceives if it moves from (NB,NB) to (B,NB), and D is the
symmetric relation from the perspective of Firm 2.
1For simplicity we assume this data is independent of and iden-
tically distributed to the data in possession of the firms.
We observe thatA = C+D. Moreover, since C andD are
nonnegative, it is immediately clear that A > max{C,D}.
Finally, when m1 > m2 (i.e. Firm 1 starts with strictly
more data), Firm 2 experiences a larger absolute change in its
market share when the outcome changes from (NB,NB) to
(NB,B) than to (B,NB). In other words, Firm 2 experi-
ences a larger increase in market share when it buys the data
compared to the decrease it experiences when Firm 1 receives
the data. We defer all the omitted proofs to Appendix A.
Lemma 5. If m1 > m2 then for all n and b we have that
C < D.
3.1 Characterization of the Equilibria
The equilibria of the game clearly depend on the values of
the parameters m1, m2, n, p and b. For example, if p >
1 (p ≤ 0), then neither firm should ever want to (not) buy
the data. We observe that, fixing the values of m1, m2, n
and b, there is a range of values for p where the data is too
expensive (too cheap) and NB (B) is a dominant strategy
for both firms. There is also an intermediate range of values
for p where more interesting behaviors emerge, as formally
characterized in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2.
1. When p ≤ max{C,D}, (B,B) is the unique equilib-
rium.
2. When p ≥ A, (NB,NB) is the unique equilibrium.
3. When max{C,D} < p < A, (B,B) and (NB,NB)
are both equilibria. Furthermore, there exists a (unique)
mixed equilibrium ((α, 1− α), (β, 1− β)) such that
α
2(1− α) =
p−D
A− p and
β
2(1− β) =
p− C
A− p ,
where α and β denote the probabilities that Firms 1 and
2 select the action B, respectively.
Proof. We use flow diagrams to analyze the equilibria of the
game (see e.g. [6] for more details on this technique). As a tu-
torial of this flow diagram argument, we carefully analyze the
diagram for the regime of our game in which p < min{C,D}
as depicted in the top left panel of Figure 3.
In a flow diagram, each vertex corresponds to a strategy
profile. An arrow indicates that one player changes its strat-
egy while the other’s action is fixed. In particular, in Figure 3
vertical (horizontal) arrows demonstrate the change of strat-
egy for Firm 1 (Firm 2). The numerical value above the arrow
indicates how much a player gains by a deviation, and arrows
are oriented so that they always point in the direction of non-
negative gain. The leftmost vertical arrow indicates that Firm
1 increases its utility by (A − p)/2 by changing its decision
from NB to B, fixing that Firm 2 is committed to playing B.
Similarly, the rightmost vertical arrow indicates that Firm 1
increases its utility by C − p when it makes this change, fix-
ing that Firm 2 is committed to playing NB. The horizontal
arrows are the symmetric results for Firm 2, fixing the action
of Firm 1. The topmost arrow indicates the increase in utility
when moving from NB to B when Firm 1 plays B, and the
bottommost corresponds to the increase in utility for the same
change of action when Firm 1 plays NB.
This particular flow diagram models the regime of the
game where the price is sufficiently low such that (B,B)
is the unique pure equilibrium. Consider the profile (B,B).
Since arrows only point at, rather than originate from, (B,B),
unilateral deviations from (B,B) are unprofitable for both
players. Hence, (B,B) is a pure strategy equilibrium in this
regime. Furthermore, there is no other pure equilibrium be-
cause there are no other ‘sinks’ in the top left panel of Fig-
ure 3. Moreover, no mixed equilibrium exists. To see this,
note that in a mixed equilibrium, a player mixing can only
mix over best responses. But since the arrows representing
Firm 2’s deviations both point towards (B,NB) is dominated
by B; hence NB cannot be a best response, so Firm 2 can-
not be mixing. But since Firm 1 is not indifferent between
B and NB if Firm 2 chooses B, Firm 1 will not mix either.
More generally, this logic means that mixed equilibria require
arrows pointing in opposite directions.
Similar logic allows us to easily analyze the continuum of
games induced as allow p varies monotonically. Every value
of p induces exactly one of the flow diagrams in Figure 3.
Thus, characterizing the equilibria in each flow diagram char-
acterizes the equilibria of the different parameter regimes.
(1) p ∈ (−∞,min{C,D}): The top left panel of Figure 3
represents the flow diagram in this regime and we can see that
the only equilibrium is the pure strategy of (B,B).
(2) p ∈ (min{C,D},max{C,D}): The top middle panel
of the Figure 3 represents the flow diagram in this regime. By
Lemma 5, (min{C,D},max{C,D}) ≡ (C,D). Again we
can see that the only equilibrium is the pure strategy (B,B).
(3) p ∈ (max{C,D}, A): The top right panel of Figure 3
represents the flow diagram in this regime. There are two
pure equilibria: (B,B) and (NB,NB). There also exists a
mixed equilibrium. In a mixed equilibrium, both players are
randomizing, and thus must be indifferent between the pure
strategies they are randomizing over; this condition allows us
to solve for the mixed strategies.
Let α denote the probability that Firm 1 is playing B. Then
in a mixed equilibrium, Firm 2 is indifferent between the two
actions. Therefore,
α
2
(
(m2 + n)
b
m1b + (m2 + n)b
+
m2
b
(m1 + n)b +m2b
− p
)
+ (1− α)
(
(m2 + n)
b
m1b + (m2 + n)b
− p
)
=
α
(
m2
b
(m1 + n)b +m2b
)
+ (1− α)
(
m2
b
m1b +m2b
)
.
By rearranging we get that
α
2(1− α) =
p−D
A− p ,
as claimed.
Similarly let β denote the probability that Firm 2 is playing
B. Then in a mixed equilibrium, Firm 1 is indifferent between
the two actions. With a similar calculation we can show that
β
2(1− β) =
p− C
A− p ,
(B,B) (B,NB)
(NB,B) (NB,NB)
1
2 (A−p)
1
2 (A−p)
D−p
C−p
(B,B) (B,NB)
(NB,B) (NB,NB)
1
2 (A−p)
p−C12 (A−p)
D−p
(B,B) (B,NB)
(NB,B) (NB,NB)
1
2 (A−p)
p−C12 (A−p)
p−D
(B,B) (B,NB)
(NB,B) (NB,NB)
1
2 (p−A)
1
2 (p−A) p−C
p−D
Figure 3: The flow diagrams for different parameter regimes. Top left panel when p ∈ (−∞,min{C,D}). Top middle when
p ∈ (min{C,D},max{C,D}). Top right panel when p ∈ (max{C,D}, A). Bottom panel when p ∈ (A,+∞).
as claimed.
(4) p ∈ (A,+∞): The bottom panel of Figure 3 represents
the flow diagram in this regime and we can see that the only
equilibrium is the pure strategy of (NB,NB).
Theorem 2 allows us to make several key observations
about the market structure of this game. First, since C
and D represent the maximum increase in the market share
firms could achieve by buying the data, the fact that the only
equilibrium when p ∈ [min{C,D},max{C,D}] is (B,B)
means that both firms buy the data despite the fact that the
best-case improvement in market share is less than what they
pay. This ‘race for data’ thus has the character of a prisoner’s
dilemma – if both firms could agree not to buy the data, they
would be better off, but either would be tempted to buy the
data and improve market share.
Second, Theorem 2 illustrates how several features of equi-
librium depend on the ferocity of competition, as determined
by the exponent a; as a varies, the frontiers of the regimes de-
scribed in Theorem 2 shift too. For example, in the case that
a = 0, market share is split evenly between the two firms,
regardless of error or accuracy; unsurprisingly, as a → 0
(which implies b → 0), A,C, and D also approach 0, so
the payoff difference between strategy profiles becomes neg-
ligible. As a consequence, the regimes (1), (2), and (3) col-
lapse, and all but very small p induce regime (4), where
(NB,NB) is the only equilibrium. Thus, for small a, unless
p is very close to zero, (NB,NB) is the only equilibrium.
We observe similar behavior when a is large. Assuming that
m1 > m2 + n, then a → ∞ implies that A → 0 (and hence
b → ∞), again implying that regimes (1), (2), and (3) col-
lapse. Thus again, unless p is very close to 0, (NB,NB) is
the unique equilibrium. This is for a different reason than the
a small case, however: Firm 1 now has no incentive to buy,
since it is guaranteed almost the whole market share using
its current model. Moreover, in this scenario, Firm 2’s initial
disadvantage is too great to be overcome by buying the data.
If a is in between these two extremes, many choices of m1
and m2 lead to a non-empty interval (max{C,D}, A), with
endpoints far from 0 and 1. When p falls in this interval,
regime (2) holds, so a mixed equilibrium exists; we discuss
solving for this mixed equilibrium in Section 3.2. The com-
plete characterization of the equilibria for all regimes of p in
Theorem 2 allows us to pin down the optimal fixed price from
the perspective of maximizing seller’s revenue. However, in
full generality, the seller’s problem encompasses further pos-
sibilities like auction pricing; hence, we defer this calculation
to future work. See Section 5 for a discussion.
3.2 Mixed Equilibrium and Monotonicity Analysis
Next, we carefully examine the mixed equilibrium and study
the relationship between the weights each firm places on each
action and the parameters of the game.
Recall that α and β in Theorem 2 denote the probability
that Firms 1 and 2 purchase the data in the mixed equilib-
rium. When m1 > m2, then α < β which implies that the
smaller firm will succeed more often in purchasing the data
in the mixed equilibrium. The relationship of α and β with
the number of data points n and the price p is as follows.
Lemma 6. Let ((α, 1−α), (β, 1−β)) denote the mixed equi-
librium in the the regime where max{C,D} < p < A. Then
α and β, both increase when p increases or n decreases.
Lemma 6 may seem counterintuitive as it implies that as
the price p rises through the range in which a mixed equilib-
rium exists, the probability that any of the firms want to buy
the data also increases. However, once the price p crosses
the threshold A, the unique equilibrium is the pure strategy
(NB,NB). This gives rise to a discontinuity. See Figure 4.
Of course, this all says nothing about the equilibrium util-
ities for the firms; as long as the equilibrium utilities are
not identical, players will naturally have ordinal preferences
over the set of equilibria. We analyze these preferences in
Lemma 7, which elucidates the discontinuity at p = A.
Lemma 7. When p ∈ (max{C,D}, A), u1(NB,NB) ≥
u1(s) and u2(NB,NB) ≥ u2(s) for all strategy profiles
s. However, u1(B,NB) ≥ u1(B,B) ≥ u1(NB,B), while
u2(NB,B) ≥ u2(B,B) ≥ u2(B,NB).
While both firms agree that (NB,NB) is the most pre-
ferred outcome, their preferences over the remaining three
outcomes are discordant. In particular, given that at least one
firm will try to buy the data, each firm would prefer itself to
be the buyer rather than the opponent. If either firm believes
the other may try to buy the data, it will put positive weight on
the actionB in the mixed equilibrium. Once the price crosses
A, both firms know that it would be irrational for the other to
buy, so we see a unique pure equilibrium of (NB,NB).
Figure 4: The probability of selecting B in equilibrium for
Firm 1 as a function of p. The blue, red and yellow lines
correspond to the (B,B), mixed and (NB,NB) equilibria.
3.3 Change in the Market Share
We now analyze the change in the market shares.
Lemma 8. When m1 ≥ m2, the only strategy profile that
strictly increases the market share of Firm 1 is (B,NB).
So while only (B,NB) leads to an increase in the market
share of Firm 1, it is not a pure equilibrium. We show that
even when firms play according to the mixed equilibrium, the
expected market share of Firm 1 does not strictly increase.
Theorem 3. When m1 ≥ m2 and p ∈ (max{C,D}, A), the
expected market share of Firm 1 does not strictly increase if
both firms play according to the mixed equilibrium.
Together, Lemma 8 and Theorem 3 demonstrate that the
natural forces of the interaction on the market are, perhaps
surprisingly, antimonopolistic. Since we assume that Firm 1
enters the game with a greater market share than Firm 2, but
that no equilibrium allows Firm 1 to increase its market share,
the game disfavors the concentration of market power. This
raises the question of whether this antimonopolistic tendency
is good for the users. We analyze this next.
3.4 Consumer Welfare in Equilibrium
We now consider the perspective of the users of the firm’s ser-
vice. We show that consumers prefer the outcome (B,NB),
in which the initially stronger firm concentrates its market
power. This is not supported by a pure equilibrium in any
regime, nor is it the most likely outcome generated by mixed
equilibrium; hence, we will see that the interests of the firms
do not align with the interests of the consumers. We define
the consumer welfare as follows.
Definition 1. Let m1(s) and m2(s) denote the (expected)
number of data points that Firm 1 and 2 posses when playing
according to strategy profile s. Then the consumer welfare is
CW (s) = µ1(s)(1−err1(m1(s)))+µ2(s)(1−err2(m2(s))).
The welfare definition arises from assuming consumers re-
ceive 1 unit of utility for accurate predictions and 0 for er-
roneous ones. Notice that maximizing this definition of con-
sumer welfare is exactly equivalent to minimizing the market-
share weighted error probability. This leads to Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. Suppose m1 > m2. Then the consumers have
the following preferences over the strategy profiles.
CW (B,NB) > CW (B,B) > CW (NB,B) > CW (NB,NB).
Note that consumers’ preference for the outcome in which
Firm 1 concentrates its market power is not the same as say-
ing that the consumers prefer a monopoly. Rather, the con-
sumers have a preference for higher quality services. When
m1 > m2, Firm 1’s model before acquiring the data has a
lower error rate than that of Firm 2, and so, of all the possible
outcomes, the one which leads to a product with the lowest
error rate is the one in which Firm 1 is able to improve on
its already superior product. But if Firm 2 were not a player
at all, then a monopolistic Firm 1 would have no incentive to
buy the new data. Therefore, a monopoly without the threat
of competition will not lead to the best outcome from the con-
sumer’s perspectives.
4 Extensions and Robustness
Next, we consider robustness to three simple extensions.
Firm Acquisition We treat the data seller as a market par-
ticipant with its own customers and market share. This allows
us to model firm acquisition: buying the data translates to ac-
quiring the firm and its customers, and neither firm buying the
data corresponds to the third firm remaining in the market.
Simultaneous Sale Rather than the data being exclusively
sold to one firm in the case that both firms buy, we allow the
seller to sell the data to both firms at the same fixed price.
Correlated Equilibria We consider the richer concept of
correlated equilibrium and search for additional equilibria.
In each of these extensions, we can again derive the quan-
tities A, C, and D; while the precise quantities change, their
rankings and relationships do not. Thus, in the first two ex-
tensions, the general phenomenon of three regimes, with mix-
ing over the middle regime, remains unchanged. In the third
extension, some new correlated equilibria exist, but none in-
clude the qualitatively different result of coordinating pur-
chase of the data by a single firm. Moreover, in expectation,
the market share becomes less asymmetric in all extensions.
5 Future Directions
We view our work as a first step towards modeling and ana-
lyzing competition for data in markets driven by ML. There
are several directions for further investigation. First, we mod-
eled the data to be acquired as having a fixed size and a fixed
price, but real datasets can be divisible. One further direction
to consider is a game in which we expand the strategy space
of the players to include buying any number of data points at
a fixed price per data point or nonlinear function of the num-
ber of data points purchased. More generally, treating the
seller of the data as an additional player in the game allows
for further questions, such as: what is the optimal revenue-
generating mechanism to sell the data? And does the optimal
mechanism maximize social welfare?
Additionally, many firms that provide learning-based ser-
vices acquire their data through their customers that use the
service. In this way, capturing a larger market share induces
a feedback loop which allows a firm to iteratively improve its
product. What can be said about our game in a repeated set-
ting with dynamic feedback effects? Furthermore, firms that
provide digital services often operate in a secondary market
in which other firms pay for advertising spots in their prod-
uct. Improving one’s market share should in principle allow a
firm to charge advertisers a higher price, but we do not know
to what extent this affects the analysis of the equilibria of the
game. Incorporating advertiser behavior would greatly com-
plicate the model but provide potentially interesting results.
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A Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 5. Define u = m1/n and v = m2/n. Then
u > v and we also have that
C =
(1 + u)b
(1 + u)b + vb
− u
b
ub + vb
,
D =
(1 + v)b
ub + (1 + v)b
− v
b
ub + vb
.
Next let U = ub, V = vb, W = (1 + u)b − ub and Z =
(1 + v)b − vb. Notice that W > 0 and Z > 0 for all b > 0.
Algebraic manipulations show that
C < D
⇔ (1 + u)
b
(1 + u)b + vb
− u
b
ub + vb
<
(1 + v)b
ub + (1 + v)b
− v
b
ub + vb
⇔ U +W
U +W + V
− V + Z
V + Z + U
<
U − V
U + V
⇔ VW (U + V + Z) < UZ(U + V +W ).
Fix a pair of (u, v) with u > v, there are two cases to
consider2: (1) W ≥ Z and (2) W < Z.
In case (1) U +V +Z ≤ U +V +W . Notice that VW <
UZ would suffice to prove the claim in this case, because
VW < UZ =⇒ VW (U + V +W ) < UZ(U + V +W )
=⇒ VW (U + V + Z) < UZ(U + V +W ).
2These two cases correspond to b > 1 and 0 < b < 1, but this
correspondence is irrelevant.
which is the last condition in the chain of double implications.
In fact, VW < UZ does hold, because
u > v =⇒ v(1 + u) < u(1 + v)
=⇒ vb(1 + u)b < ub(1 + v)b
=⇒ vb((1 + u)b − ub) < ub((1 + v)b − vb)
=⇒ VW < UZ.
Now we turn to the second case. Suppose W < Z. We
again must show that VW (U +V +Z) < UZ(U +V +W ).
Notice that the following implication holds.
VW (U + V + Z) < UW (U + V +W ) =⇒
VW (U + V + Z) < UZ(U + V +W ),
since
UW (U + V +W ) < UZ(U + V +W ).
Hence we show that the first inequality is true. Note that
VW (U + V + Z) < UW (U + V +W )
⇐⇒ V (U + V + Z) < U(U + V +W )
⇐⇒ V (V + Z) < U(U +W )
⇐⇒ vb(1 + v)b < ub(1 + u)b,
which is trivially true by u > v and b > 0.
Hence in both cases, we have that
VW (U + V + Z) < UZ(U + V +W ) =⇒ C < D,
concluding the proof. Finally, we note that symmetry yields
the corresponding claim m2 > m1 =⇒ D < C.
Proof of Lemma 6. The left hand sides of the equations char-
acterizing the mixed equilibrium in the statement of Theo-
rem 2 have the form c/(2(1 − c)) which is increasing in c
when c ∈ (0, 1). If we call the left hand side of either of
these equations `, we can solve for c = 2`/(1 + 2`) which is
also monotonically increasing in ` over ` ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, to
analyze the monotonicity of the c, it is suffices to analyze the
monotonicity of `. But since ` must also equal the right hand
side, it suffices to analyze the monotonicity of the right hand
sides of these equations.
Since p does not appear in b, C or D, it is easy to see that
both fractions (p−D)/(A−p) and (p−C)/(A−p) increase
as p increases. Hence, both α and β increase as p increases
in the regime p ∈ (max{C,D}, A). The parameter n on the
other hand appears in A, C and D. All of these parameters
increase as n increases. It is then similarly easy to see that
both fractions (p−D)/(A−p) and (p−C)/(A−p) decrease
as n increases.
Proof of Lemma 7. We claim that the ordinal preferences of
Firm 1 over the outcomes are as follows.
u1(NB,NB) ≥ u1(B,NB) ≥ u1(B,B) ≥ u1(NB,B).
Since u1(B,B) = (u1(B,NB) + u1(NB,B))/2, it suffices to
show that
u1(NB,NB) ≥ u1(B,NB) ≥ u1(NB,B).
We first show that u1(NB,NB) ≥ u1(B,NB).
p− C ≥ 0 =⇒ p− (m1 + n)
b
(m1 + n)b +m2b
+
m1
b
m1b +m2b
≥ 0
=⇒ m1
b
m1b +m2b
≥ (m1 + n)
b
(m1 + n)b +m2b
− p
=⇒ u1(NB,NB) ≥ u1(B,NB).
We then show that u1(B,NB) ≥ u1(NB,B).
A− p ≥ 0 =⇒ (m1 + n)
b
(m1 + n)b +m2b
− m1
b
m1b + (m2 + n)b
− p ≥ 0
=⇒ (m1 + n)
b
(m1 + n)b +m2b
− p ≥ m1
b
m1b + (m2 + n)b
=⇒ u1(B,NB) ≥ u1(NB,B).
Moreover, the ordinal preferences of Firm 2 are as follows.
u2(NB,NB) ≥ u2(NB,B) ≥ u2(B,B) ≥ u2(B,NB).
Again note that u2(B,B) = (u2(NB,B) + u2(B,NB))/2.
So it suffices to show that u2(NB,NB) ≥ u2(NB,B) ≥
u2(NB,B).
We first show that u2(NB,NB) ≥ u2(NB,B).
p−D ≥ 0 =⇒ p− (m2 + n)
b
m1b + (m2 + n)b
+
m2
b
m1b +m2b
≥ 0
=⇒ m2
b
m1b +m2b
≥ (m2 + n)
b
m1b + (m2 + n)b
− p
=⇒ u2(NB,NB) ≥ u2(NB,B).
We wrap up by showing that u2(NB,B) ≥ u1(B,NB).
A− p ≥ 0 =⇒ (m1 + n)
b
(m1 + n)b +m2b
− m1
b
m1b + (m2 + n)b
− p ≥ 0
=⇒
(
1− m2
b
(m1 + n)b +m2b
)
−(
1− (m2 + n)
b
m1b + (m2 + n)b
)
− p ≥ 0
=⇒ (m2 + n)
b
m1b + (m2 + n)b
− p ≥ m2
b
(m1 + n)b +m2b
=⇒ u2(NB,B) ≥ u1(B,NB).
Proof of Theorem 3. Let α and β be as in Theorem 2. First
observe that by rewriting the conditions for the mixed equi-
librium, we get that
α =
2 (p−D)
A+ p− 2D and β =
2 (p− C)
A+ p− 2C .
Then in the mixed equilibrium, the four outcomes occur with
the following probabilities:
1. (B,NB) with probability α(1− β),
2. (NB,B) with probability (1− α)β,
3. (NB,NB) with probability (1− α)(1− β), and
4. (B,B) with probability αβ.
The expected change in Firm 1’s market share can be calcu-
lated by summing over the change in its market share in each
outcome (see the proof of Lemma 8), weighted by how of-
ten the outcome occurs in the mixed equilibrium. Thus the
expected change in Firm 1’s market share is
α (1− β)C + (1− α)βD + (1− α) (1− β) 0 + αβC −D
2
= 2
(
(C −D) (p (A− C −D) + CD)
(A+ p− 2C) (A+ p− 2D)
)
.
Since we are only interested in whether the market share in-
creases or decreases, we only care about the sign of the above
term. The denominator is always positive, as both terms in
the denominator are positive when p ∈ (max{C,D}, A). So
it suffices to show that the numerator is non-negative.
When m1 = m2 then the first term in the numerator is
zero, so the expected market share is the same as the initial
market share. On the other hand when m1 > m2, Lemma 5
implies that the first term in the numerator is negative. We
claim that the second term in the numerator is always posi-
tive. To see this, first observe that p (A− C −D) + CD is
a linear function of p and it is strictly positive at both end
points p = max{C,D} = C (by Lemma 5) and p = A. By
the properties of linear functions, the term is positive for all
values of p between max{C,D} and A, which is exactly the
regime we are interested in.
Proof of Lemma 8. The change in the market share of Firm
1 in strategy profiles (B,NB) compared to the beginning of
the game is the parameter C, which is always positive. Sim-
ilarly, the change in the market share of Firm 2 in strategy
profile (NB,B) compared to the beginning of the game is
the parameter D. The change in the market share of Firm 1
in this strategy profile is −D since the sum of market shares
is always one, and since D is always positive, −D is nega-
tive. Moreover, the expected change in Firm 1’s market share
for (B,B) is (C −D)/2 because we decide which firm pur-
chases the data by a fair coin toss. By Lemma 5, D ≥ C, so
(C − D)/2 ≤ 0. Finally, there is no change in the market
shares in the outcome (NB,NB). Thus, only for (B,NB)
does Firm 1’s market share strictly increase.
Proof of Theorem 4. We first simplify the consumer welfare
for a strategy profile s by shorthands err1 ≡ err1(m1(s)),
err2 ≡ err1(m2(s)), µ1 ≡ µ1(s) and µ2 ≡ µ2(s).
CW (s) = µ1 (1− err1) + µ2 (1− err2)
=
errb2
errb1 + err
b
2
(1− err1) + err
b
1
errb1 + err
b
2
(1− err2)
= 1− err
b
1err2 + err
b
2err1
errb1 + err
b
2
.
So the strategy profile that maximizes the social welfare of the
consumers equivalently maximizing the following equation
max
s
CW (s) ≡ max
s
errb1 + err
b
2
errb1err2 + err
b
2err1
.
We take the following three steps to prove the statement
of the theorem: (1) CW (B,NB) > CW (NB,B), (2)
CW (B,B) = (CW (NB,B) + CW (B,NB)) /2 and (3)
CW (NB,NB) < CW (s) for all s 6= (NB,NB). For sim-
plicity in the rest of the proof we assume that the error scales
with the square root of the number of data points.
To prove part (1), first, observe that
(m1 + n)
(b−1)/2m1
b/2 (√m1 + n−√m1)
−(m2 + n)(b−1)/2m2b/2
(√
m2 + n−√m2
)
> 0,
since
(m1 + n)
(b−1)/2m1
b/2 > (m2 + n)
(b−1)/2m2
b/2,
when m1 > m2 and also(√
m1 + n−√m1
)
> m2
b/2 (√m2 + n−√m2) ,
since the function f(w) =
√
w + b −√w is increasing in w
when b > 0. Adding a positive term to the expression above,
we get that
(m1 + n)
(b−1)/2m1
b/2 (√m1 + n−√m1)
− (m2 + n)(b−1)/2m2b/2
(√
m2 + n−√m2
)
+
(
(m1 + n)
(b−1)/2(m2 + n)
(b−1)/2 −m1(b−1)/2m2(b−1)/2
)
×
(
√
m1 −√m2) > 0
=⇒ (m1 + n)b/2m1(b−1)/2 + (m1 + n)b/2(m2 + n)(b−1)/2
+m1
(b−1)/2m2
b/2 + (m2 + n)
(b−1)/2yb/2
> (m1 + n)
(b−1)/2m1
b/2 + (m1 + n)
(b−1)/2(m2 + n)
b/2
+m1
b/2m2
(b−1)/2 + (m2 + n)
b/2m2
(b−1)/2
=⇒ (m1 + n)
b/2 +m2
b/2
(m1 + n)(b−1)/2 +m2(b−1)/2
>
m1
b/2 + (m2 + n)
b/2
m1(b−1)/2 + (m2 + n)(b−1)/2
=⇒ (m1 + n)
−b/2 +m2−b/2
(m1 + n)−b/2
√
m2 +m2−b/2
√
(m1 + n)
>
m1
−b/2 + (m2 + n)−b/2
m1−b/2
√
m2 + n+ (m2 + n)−b/2
√
m1
=⇒ CW (B,NB) > (NB,B).
In the penultimate step we multiplied the numerator and de-
nominator of the left and right hand fractions by (m1 +
n)−b/2m2−b/2 and (m2 + n)−b/2m1−b/2, respectively.
Part (2) is trivial given that in our model when both
players choose B one of the strategy profiles (B,NB)
and (NB,B) is chosen with equal probability. Since
CW (B,NB) > CW (NB,B) by part (1) then part (2) im-
plies that CW (B,NB) > CW (B,B) > CW (NB,B). To
prove part (3), we show that CW is increasing in m2. This
implies that CW (NB,B) > CW (NB,NB). To show that
the function CW is increasing in m2 we show that the partial
derivative with respect to m2 is positive.
∂CW (NB,NB)
∂m2
=
∂
∂m2
(
m1
−b/2 +m2b−/2
m1−b/2
√
m2 +m2−b/2
√
m1
)
=
(
m1
−b/2√m2 +m2−b/2√m1
)−2
×(
− b
2
m1
−(b+1)/2
(
(m1
−b/2√m2 +m2−b/2√m1
)
+
b
2
(
(m1
−b/2 +m2
−b/2
)
+
x−3/2
2
(
m1
−b/2 +m2
−b/2
))
=
1
2m1 (m1−b/2
√
m2 +m2−b/2
√
m1)
2×(
bm1
b
(
1− 1√
m2
)
+ bm1
−b/2y−b/2
(
1− 1√
m1
)
+
1√
m1
(
m1
−b/2 +m2
−b/2
))
> 0,
which is positive since both m1 ≥ 1 and m2 ≥ 1.
